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11 Introduction
During the 1990s temporary agency work has increased rapidly in practically
all OECD countries. In every Member State of the European Union (except
Greece where it is illegal), temporary agency work has at least doubled during
the 1990s, and in Scandinavia, Spain, Italy and Austria, it has increased at
least ﬁve-fold. By the end of the decade it accounted for 1.3 percent of the
stock of employment in the EU, Storrie (2002). The United States has also
seen more than a doubling of agency employment in the 1990s, from 1.2
percent to 2.6 percent (Houseman et al. (2001)). Temporary agency work
has been de-regulated in several European countries in 1990s and a proposed
directive on agency work is currently before the European Parliament.1
Temporary agency work is the most recent expression of the proliferation
of employment relationships in the last three decades. It can be deﬁned as
follows. The temporary agency worker is employed by the temporary work
agency and, by means of a commercial contract, is hired out to perform work
assignments at a client ﬁrm. This deﬁnition varies between countries only
with respect to the employment status of the worker at the agency.
In this paper we extend an equilibrium unemployment model, as in Di-
amond (1981), Mortensen (1982), and Pissarides (1990) with temporary
agency work in order to focus on its role as a matching intermediary and
its aggregate impact on employment. To our knowledge the only formal
model of agency work is Autor (2003) which relates the rise of agency work
to the decline of employment-at-will in the United States. While this may
be a reasonable hypothesis in the US, the rise of agency work in Europe
can hardly be related to a tightening of employment protection in the last
decade. Empirical work by Katz and Krueger (1999) based on regional data
and representative case studies in Houseman et al. (2001) focus instead on
the matching function of agencies.
Similar extensions of the equilibrium model of unemployment can be
found in Holmlund and Lind´ en (1993), where macroeconomic eﬀects of ‘re-
1The main aim of the directive is to establish the general principle of non-
discrimination, in terms of basic working conditions, of agency workers compared to work-
ers in the user ﬁrm doing the same or similar work. There are however several important
exceptions: where a temporary worker has a permanent contract and is paid between as-
signments, where social partners can conclude collective agreements derogating from the
principle by providing for alternative means to secure adequate protection and where an
assignment or series of assignments with one user ﬁrm will not exceed 6 weeks.
2lief jobs’ are studied. Wasmer (1999) uses this approach to study the role
of productivity growth on the emergence of ﬁxed-term contracts. Fredriks-
son and Holmlund (2001), Boone et al. (2002), and Coe and Snower (1997)
model the optimal design of unemployment beneﬁt systems in such a ﬂow
setting. Pissarides (2001) studies the role of employment protection legis-
lation in equilibrium unemployment. The political economy of active labor
market policies is studied by Saint-Paul (1998), and crowding-out eﬀects of
low-educated workers on low skilled jobs by high-educated workers in Spain
are modelled by Dolado et al. (2000) in such a framework.
We argue that deregulation of temporary agency work together with the
widespread use of information and communication technologies helped to
overcome a critical threshold level under which there were no positive rev-
enues for temporary work agencies so that a market for agency activities
could emerge. Further increases in matching eﬃciency due to improvements
in reputation and, with the ever-closer relationships between agencies and
client ﬁrms, the mitigation of some coordination failure, sustained the growth
of agency work throughout the 1990s. Employing an equilibrium unemploy-
ment model of the labor market also allows us to study the aggregate impact
of temporary work agencies. In a calibrated version of our model, we address
issues such as whether temporary agency jobs crowd out other, ‘regular’ jobs.
In this sense, we complement microstudies on transitions on the labor mar-
ket that cannot identify net aggregate eﬀects. See, for example, Almus et al.
(1998).
The model is developed in section 3. Some analytical results are presented
in section 4. In particular, it shows that intermediaries on the labor market
will only exist if they are very eﬃcient in placing workers to client ﬁrms.
Section 5 presents some simulation results of the model. The last section
concludes. However, before introducing the model it may be useful to present
some basic empirical and institutional background to this novel and relatively
un-researched employment relationship.
3Table 1: Temporary agency work in 1999
Rate of agency work in %
Netherlands 4.0
Luxembourg 3.5
France 2.7
USA 2.6
UK 2.1
Belgium 1.6
EU 1.4
Portugal 1.0
Spain 0.8
Sweden 0.8
Austria 0.7
Denmark 0.7
Germany 0.7
Finland 0.6
Ireland 0.6
Italy 0.2
Greece 0
Sources: For European countries see Storrie (2002). U.S. ﬁgures are from Houseman
et al. (2001) and refer to 2000.
42 Temporary agency work: some basic em-
pirical and institutional features
Table 1 presents the most recent available compilation of statistics on the
level of temporary agency work with some degree of comparibility.2 The
Netherlands is the most agency work intensive country, followed by Luxem-
bourg, France, the US, the UK and Belgium. The intensity is low in Austria,
Germany, and the Scandinavian and Southern European countries.
Many of the characteristics of agency workers are similar to those in other
temporary jobs, see for example, Booth et al. (2002), Dolado et al. (2002), and
Holmlund and Storrie (2002). Thus, on average agency workers are younger,
less well-educated and receive lower wages and less training than workers
with more permanent contractual status, see Paoli and Merlli´ e (2001) and
Storrie (2002). However, unlike the gender and sector distribution of ﬁxed-
term contracts, agency work is generally most intense among men and in
industry.3 Temporary agency work is of very short duration, even shorter
than ﬁxed-term contracts, both in terms of the assignment at the client ﬁrm
and the employment spell at the agency, see Storrie (2002). While some
workers express a preference for agency work, they are a clear minority, see
for example Cohany (1998). The rapid increase in the 1990s must be driven
by the client ﬁrms’ demand for agency work and the agencies’ capability to
supply it.
There are a number of reasons why the ﬁrm may hire labor on a tempo-
rary basis, such as for a speciﬁc task that is limited in duration, to replace
an absent permanent employee, etc., see for example Schmid and Storrie
(2001). Whatever the reason, severance costs may make frequent employ-
ment contracts for a short duration unproﬁtable for the ﬁrm. One of the
most prominent trends in labor law in the last two decades in Europe has
been the proliferation of the circumstances for which the employer may hire
2Data on temporary agency work is generally of very poor quality. In most countries
questions on agency work are not asked in the labor force survey and even when they are
research indicates serious reporting errors, see for example, Burchell et al. (1999). However,
while one should be somewhat sceptical as to the accuracy of the level of temporary agency
work, and comparisons between countries, the rapid increase of agency work in the 1990s
is indisputable.
3Of course, there are some examples of higher wages and training levels in agency work
than for otherwise similar directly employed persons. See Houseman et al. (2001) and
Cam et al. (2002).
5labor under conditions other than those under open-ended contracts. The
employment protection literature explaining the rise and consequences of
“ﬂexible” employment contracts takes relatively lower severance costs as a
theoretical point of departure. See Dolado et al. (2002) for a recent review
of the interesting Spanish research.
We do not address the issue of why establishments in most OECD coun-
tries in the last two decades have, to an increasing degree, used various forms
of temporary employment contracts, but take it as a stylized fact. However,
it is relevant for this paper to demonstrate that agency work may be a more
appropriate means of performing the same functions as temporary employ-
ment contracts.4 The truly distinguishing feature of agency work in this
context is that adjustment costs are directly borne by the agency. Of course,
the client ﬁrm pays for this service, and this is a source of agency proﬁts.
However, the specialization of such functions in agencies with the potential
for ensuing economies of scale, together with the potential for agencies to
spread employment termination risks between various ﬁrms and sectors of
the economy, may lead to lower costs through an outsourcing of these func-
tions to the agency than for the client ﬁrms to perform them in-house. The
outsourcing of some functions of the personnel department at the client ﬁrm
is more obviously apparent when viewing the other, often-neglected, aspect
of employment adjustment costs, i.e. recruitment. Matching is the key issue
in our model and we return to why matching eﬃciency in agencies may be
relatively high and has increased in the last decade in section 4.1.
There is some evidence that temporary work agencies are beginning to
play a highly signiﬁcant role as a matching intermediary. Katz and Krueger
(1999) suggest that the rise of temporary agency work, with its potential
to improve matching, may be a major factor in explaining the remarkable
downward shift of the Phillips curve in the US during the 1990s. They
ﬁnd some empirical support for this claim by noting that the increase of
temporary agency work coincided with an inward shift of the Beveridge curve.
Furthermore, using cross-state regressions they ﬁnd evidence that the rise of
temporary work agencies in a state held down wage growth. However, they
view their analysis as being “preliminary and highly speculative”. Houseman
et al. (2001) present some case study evidence which shows that the matching
motive is an important factor behind the client ﬁrm’s increasing recourse to
4Surveys of client ﬁrms ﬁnd that the motivation for using agency workers are very
similar to those for ﬁxed-term contracts. See CIETT (2000) and Cam et al. (2002).
6temporary agency work.
On the supply side, the increase in agency work in Europe is obviously
related to the widespread deregulation of the sector during the 1990s, see
OECD (1999) and Storrie (2002). The impact is indisputable in the coun-
tries where agency work has gone from being illegal to practically without
regulation at all. This has been the case in Sweden and Finland and the
changes in Italy and Spain have been almost as extensive.
There are three main means of regulation. First, the regulation of the
sector, for example, as regards authorization and monitoring of the ﬁrms or
the banning of agency work in particular industries. Second, to regulate the
assignment at the client ﬁrm in a fashion similar to the restrictions placed
on hiring on ﬁxed-term contracts, for example, in terms of duration and “ob-
jective reasons”. Third, the regulation of the contract at the agency where
the essential matter is whether the agency worker is awarded the status of an
employee or not. The US, UK, Ireland, Sweden, Finland and Denmark have
practically no regulation of the sector or assignment. However, in Scandi-
navia, it is clear that the worker has an employment contract at the agency,
while this is not always the case in the UK, Ireland and the USA. Most
of the continental European countries, in particular France, Belgium, Italy,
Spain and Portugal have a detailed regulation of both the sector and the
assignment.
The trend appears to be moving away from the regulation of the assign-
ment and sector towards some employment security for the worker at the
agency. This is most noticeable in the Dutch legislation, of the late 1990s,
which removed practically all regulation of the assignment and the sector
but clariﬁed that the agency worker did have an employment contract at the
agency, which with time gives increased employment protection, see Pot et al.
(2002). The radical deregulation in Scandinavia in the mid-1990s stipulated
only employment contract status. Also in the UK, a spate of legislation at
the the end of the decade extended various rights to “workers” which previ-
ously applied only to “employees” and encompassed many agency workers.
It is thus this type of institutional set-up that we work with in the model in
this paper, i.e. with employment status for agency workers and with some
degree of income security.
Finally, we should note that such an institutional set-up, i.e. the de-
regulation of agency work as regards assignments and the sector, while award-
ing employment status to agency workers may provide a step towards the
solution to one of the major conﬂicts in OECD labor markets in the last two
7decades. It has always been assumed that the employers’ demand for numer-
ical ﬂexibility and the workers preference for job security are irreconcilable.
However, in principle, agency work can provide some employment security at
the agency while providing ﬂexible assignments at the client ﬁrm. Temporary
agency work should thus be an important research topic in economics.
3 The model
3.1 Flow equilibria
We model four labor market states and corresponding ﬂows (see ﬁgure 1).
Workers can be unemployed U, employed on a regular job E, in the pool of
workers of a temporary work agency A, or assigned to a job at a client ﬁrm
T. Diﬀerentiating between states A and T captures the most outstanding
characteristic of temporary agency work as a three party relationship. A
worker is employed with a work agency in A, but assigned to a client in
T. Thus matching occurs in bringing workers and temporary work agencies
together as well as in assigning workers to client ﬁrms. Let the size of the
labor force be (e + a + t + u = 1), assuming that labor force growth is zero,
where e, a, and t denote employment in states E, A, and T, respectively, and
u is unemployment.
Job speciﬁc shocks occur at exogenous rates ¹i with i = E;T;A. If a
shock hits a job in sector E the worker will become unemployed. He will also
become unemployed, if a shock makes jobs at the temporary work agency
(A) redundant. At a rate ¹T temporary jobs at the client ﬁrm (T) go sour.
Then our worker will end up in the pool of workers of the temporary work
agency.
Job oﬀers for regular employment arrive at an unemployed person with a
rate ®E and rate ®A for an agency job. We assume that workers accept the
ﬁrst job oﬀer, regardless of whether it is a regular job or a job at an agency.
A worker at an agency waiting for an assignment gets regular job oﬀers at
the rate cA ¢ ®E. An agency will ﬁnd an assignment for a worker at a client
ﬁrm at a rate ®T. While assigned to a client our worker gets a job oﬀer
for regular employment with rate cT ¢ ®E. We call the parameters cA and
cT search eﬀectiveness of workers in states A and T relative to unemployed
workers.
Bringing job searchers Si and vacancies Vi together so that a job is
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Figure 1: Labor market ﬂows
9formed incurs frictions. Matching workers to jobs is costly because of hetero-
geneity of job searchers and vacancies. Empirical research (see Petrongolo
and Pissarides (2001)) suggests a constant returns matching technology and
so we assume a Cobb-Douglas function in both sectors. Hence, we have
Mi = mi ¢ V º
i ¢ S
1¡º
i with scale parameters mi.
A ﬁrm that posts a vacancy in sector E faces job searchers from U, A
and T. Taking into account diﬀerent search eﬀectiveness we have SE =
u + cA ¢ a + cT ¢ t. Temporary work agencies only search in the pool of
unemployed workers, SA = u. Furthermore, we have ST = a, as temporary
work agencies assign workers to client ﬁrms in T.
We deﬁne labor market tightness for ﬁrms in E, A and U as vacancies
over job searchers, µi =
Vi
Si, respectively. Any ﬁrm will ﬁll a vacancy at the
rate qi =
Mi
Vi = Mi(1; 1
µi).
The ﬂow of new hires into the regular sector is given by ME = ®E ¢
SE. Hence, the outﬂow from unemployment into regular jobs is the rate
at which job oﬀers occur times the number of unemployed searchers ®E ¢
u. The ﬂow from unemployment to temporary work agencies is given by
®A ¢ u. The outﬂow from sector A into regular employment corresponds to
eﬀective searchers in A times the job oﬀer arrival rate, cA ¢ a ¢ ®E. The ﬂow
of assignments is ®T ¢ a. Hires into regular employment from temporary
work are cT ¢ ®E ¢ t. Note that job oﬀer arrival rates can also be written as
®i =
Mi
Vi ¢
Vi
Si = qi ¢ µi with i = E;A;T.
The vacancy ﬁlling rate declines with labor market tightness q0
i(µi) < 0.
The job oﬀer arrival rates increases in labor market tightness ®0
i(µi) > 0.
The ﬂow equilibria are determined by equations (1) to (4):
®E ¢ u + cA ¢ ®E ¢ a + cT ¢ ®E ¢ t = ¹E ¢ e (1)
¹E ¢ e + ¹A ¢ a = ®E ¢ u + ®A ¢ u (2)
®A ¢ u + ¹T ¢ t = ¹A ¢ a + cA ¢ ®E ¢ a + ®T ¢ a (3)
®T ¢ a = cT ¢ ®E ¢ t + ¹T ¢ t: (4)
3.2 Labor demand
Let JE;V be the present discounted value of the expected proﬁts of a vacant
regular job and r the interest rate. The per time unit costs of a vacant job
r ¢ JE;V must equal the expected return within that time unit t. The hiring
costs per time unit are kE. The rate at which a job is ﬁlled is qE. The excess
10value of a ﬁlled job is (JE;F ¡ JE;V ), where JE;F is the present discounted
value of expected proﬁts from a ﬁlled regular job. Hence, the value function
for a vacant job in sector E can be written as
r ¢ JE;V = ¡kE + qE ¢ (JE;F ¡ JE;V ): (5)
The free entry condition implies that ﬁrms exploit all the proﬁt opportunities
by posting a vacancy and thus the value of a vacant job in equilibrium is zero.
Under the assumption of free entry, equation (5) becomes JE;F =
kE
qE. As qE
is the expected duration of a vacancy, the latter states that in equilibrium
the expected costs of a vacancy equal the expected discounted proﬁts of a
ﬁlled job.
A ﬁrm i earns y with a regular job, has wage costs wi and faces the risk
that the job becomes unproductive with probability ¹E. This diminishes
returns by JE;F;i¡JE;V . If the job becomes unproductive and the worker has
to leave the ﬁrm, ﬁring costs accrue. Empirical work shows that severance
payments, a pure transfer from the ﬁrm to the worker, denoted by s in our
model, make up by far the largest part of total ﬁring costs. See Garibaldi
and Violante (1999). Hence, the value function for a ﬁlled job is:
r ¢ JE;F;i = y ¡ wi ¡ ¹E ¢ (JE;F;i ¡ JE;V ) ¡ ¹E ¢ s: (6)
Let ﬁrms be small compared to the economy. Thus, the bargained wage
at each ﬁrm i has no impact on the wage level in the economy, so that in
equilibrium the wage at ﬁrm i is equal to the economy wide wage w. Then,
regular job creation, which corresponds to a marginal condition for labor
demand, follows from equations (5), (6), and JE;V = 0 as
kE
qE
=
y ¡ w ¡ ¹E ¢ s
r + ¹E
: (7)
Labor demand for regular jobs in sector E is such that the expected costs of a
vacancy, the left hand side of equation (7), equal expected discounted returns
from a ﬁlled job. If there were no costs for posting a vacancy (kE = 0) and
no severance payments, the usual condition would hold with the marginal
return equal to the wage. As q0
E(µE) < 0 labor demand is downward sloping
in the wage tightness space.
Firms may also open a vacancy for a temporary worker. We denote these
jobs T. The costs of opening these vacancies per time unit are kT. The ﬁrm
11can ﬁll the vacancy with a worker borrowed from a temporary work agency
at the rate qT. We assume that productivity on temporary jobs is the same
as on regular jobs. See Houseman et al. (2001) for case study evidence on
this assumption. The wage costs for the client ﬁrm shall be ¾¢w. This means
that client ﬁrms pay a mark-up (¾¡1) on the wage w that is paid to workers
on a regular job. Later we will introduce an equal proﬁts condition that
determines ¾. For the moment note, that the value equations for temporary
jobs become
r ¢ JT;V = ¡kT + qT ¢ (JT;F ¡ JT;V) (8)
for the vacancy and
r ¢ JT;F = y ¡ ¾ ¢ w ¡ ¹T ¢ (JT;F ¡ JT;V) ¡ cT ¢ ®E ¢ (JT;F ¡ JT;V) (9)
for the ﬁlled job. With free entry to the market (JT;V = 0) the marginal
condition for labor demand for temporary workers is
kT
qT
=
y ¡ ¾ ¢ w
r + ¹T + cT ¢ ®E
: (10)
Finally, let us turn to labor demand of temporary work agencies. They
hire workers from the pool of the unemployed. If a temporary work agency
ﬁnds a worker the vacancy gets ﬁlled. We denote that state with F. How-
ever, the job remains unproductive until the temporary agency ﬁnds an as-
signment. This state is denoted with P. The value functions from which the
temporary work agencies’ demand for labor follows are thus:
r ¢ JA;V = ¡kA + qA ¢ (JA;F ¡ JA;V); (11)
r ¢ JA;F = ¡ f + ®T ¢ (JA;P ¡ JA;F)¡
¹A ¢ (JA;F ¡ JA;V) ¡ cA ¢ ®E ¢ (JA;F ¡ JA;V );
(12)
and
r ¢ JA;P =¾ ¢ w ¡ ± ¢ w¡
¹T ¢ (JA;P ¡ JA;F) ¡ cT ¢ ®E ¢ (JA;P ¡ JA;V ):
(13)
Again, the expected per time unit returns to a vacant job have to equal the
per time unit opportunity cost r¢JA;V. The expected returns are comprised of
the additional value JA;F ¡JA;V when a vacancy can be ﬁlled with probability
qA minus the costs of opening a vacancy denoted by kA. The returns of having
12an un-assigned worker consist of a retainer fee f that is paid to the worker,
the value of a productive job over an idle job times the probability that the
worker can be assigned, and losses that accrue if the unproductive job goes
sour or if the worker ﬁnds a regular job. A ﬁlled and productive job brings in
¾¢w to the temporary work agency. That is the fee the client ﬁrm has to pay
for borrowing the worker. The worker himself gets ± ¢ w from the temporary
work agency. Returns are also diminished for the agency if the assignment
at the client ﬁrm goes sour with probability ¹T. We assume that in this case
the worker returns to the agency.5 The worker is unproductive then, waiting
for another assignment. The last term on the right hand side reﬂects the
transition of a temporary worker assigned to a client ﬁrm to a regular job
which occurs at the rate cT ¢®E. In this case, the job at the temporary work
agency becomes vacant. The temporary work agency looses JA;P ¡ JA;V.
The parameter ± which determines the income of an assigned agency
worker as a fraction of the wage on a regular job and the retainer fee f is
elaborated in more detail in the following section. Let us here state what
follows from the value functions for labor demand from agencies. Free entry
implies JA;V = 0. Equations (11), (12), (13) and the free entry condition
yield the marginal condition for labor demand of temporary work agencies
as
kA
qA
=
®T ¢ (¾ ¡ ±) ¢ w ¡ (r + ¹T + cT ¢ ®E) ¢ f
(r + ¹T + cT ¢ ®E)(r + ®T + ¹A + cA ¢ ®E) ¡ ®T ¢ ¹T
: (14)
Note that JA;P = 1=®T ¢(JA;F ¢(r+®T +¹A+cA¢®E)+f) from which follows
that the net return of a productive job is always larger than the returns from
a ﬁlled job (JA;P > JA;F) where the worker is yet to be assigned to a client
ﬁrm.
We assume that temporary work agencies will charge fees to the client
ﬁrm for lending out a worker such that expected proﬁts from the assignment
in T and regular jobs in E equalize.6 Hence, temporary work agencies will
choose a ¾ such that (y¡w¡¹E ¢s)=(r+¹e) = (y¡¾¢w)=(r+¹T +cT ¢®E).
Rewriting this condition gives ¾ as
5This is in line with the degree of job and income security outlined in section 2, as
exempliﬁed by open-ended contracts being the norm in Scandinavia and the job security
awarded in the recent legislation in the Netherlands.
6Note, that this assumption is very much in the spirit of Dolado et al. (2000) who
determine training costs for low skilled workers to be employed on less productive jobs in
a matching model in such a way.
13¾
¤ =
1
w
¢ (y ¡
r + ¹T + cT ¢ ®E
r + ¹E
¢ (y ¡ w ¡ ¹E ¢ s)): (15)
3.3 Value functions for workers
Let ÃE, ÃT, ÃA, and ÃU denote the present discounted value of the expected
income stream of having a regular job E, of being assigned to a client ﬁrm in
T, being in the pool of a temporary work agency (A), and being unemployed
(U), respectively. Interpreting the present discounted values as assets, then
in equilibrium every asset has to give a return per time unit equal to the
capital market yield at the interest rate r. Thus, the return per time unit
for a regularly employed individual i can be written as
r ¢ ÃE;i = wi ¡ ¹E ¢ (ÃE;i ¡ ÃU) + ¹E ¢ s:
When being regularly employed, the individual earns a wage wi per time
unit. At a rate ¹E he looses his job and becomes unemployed. This amounts
to a value loss of ÃE;i¡ÃU. However, the worker receives severance payments
s.
The value function for the state of unemployment can be written as
r ¢ ÃU = b + ®E ¢ (ÃE ¡ ÃU) + ®A ¢ (ÃA ¡ ÃU):
The left hand side can be interpreted as the reservation wage of an unem-
ployed worker as it is the minimum income that has to be paid so that he
ceases to search. The ﬁrst term on the right hand side, b, is the per time
unit income from unemployment. While unemployed the worker will move
to employment in sector E with rate ®E and gain ÃE ¡ÃU. He may also get
a job at a temporary work agency at a rate ®A which would raise income by
ÃA ¡ ÃU.
The value function for a worker at a temporary work agency is
r ¢ ÃA = f + ®T ¢ (ÃT ¡ ÃA) + cA ¢ ®E ¢ (ÃE ¡ ÃA) ¡ ¹A ¢ (ÃA ¡ ÃU):
Workers in sector A receive a retainer fee f for being in the agency pool.
With probability ®T they become assigned to a client and become productive.
Workers in sector A ﬁnd a job in sector E with probability cA ¢ ®E which
yields additional value of ÃE ¡ ÃA. Unproductive jobs at temporary work
14agencies, while workers wait to be assigned, are destroyed at rate ¹A which
yields a loss of ÃA ¡ ÃU.
While being assigned to a client ﬁrm the worker receives a fraction ± of
the wage w that is paid for regular jobs, ﬁnds a regular job at a rate cT ¢®E,
or looses his assignment with probability ¹T. Hence, the value function for
an assigned worker is
r ¢ ÃT = ± ¢ w ¡ ¹T ¢ (ÃT ¡ ÃA) + cT ¢ ®E ¢ (ÃE ¡ ÃT):
Incentive compatibility requires that the present discounted expected
value for a worker employed in sector E is larger than the value as a tem-
porary worker and equal or greater than the value of being unemployed
ÃE > ÃT ¸ ÃA ¸ ÃU.
A temporary work agency strives to keep the costs for workers as low
as possible. If we assume, that all the unemployed workers are powerless
vis ` a vis temporary work agencies, we may postulate that temporary work
agencies oﬀer retainer fees f and wages ±¢w which make their workers at the
margin indiﬀerent between working at a temporary work agency and stay-
ing unemployed (ÃT = ÃA = ÃU). Admittedly, this is a strong assumption
but it simpliﬁes the analytical framework strikingly.7 Furthermore, evidence
suggests that temporary agency workers have a poor bargaining position,
due to their often marginal position in the labor force, and low degree of
unionization and representation, (Storrie (2002)) and thus have a weak bar-
gaining position. If we employ the assumption of very powerful temporary
work agencies that unilaterally can decide on the income of their employees,
the value equations become:
r ¢ ÃE;i = wi ¡ ¹E ¢ (ÃE;i ¡ ÃU) + ¹E ¢ s (16)
r ¢ ÃU = b + ®E ¢ (ÃE ¡ ÃU) (17)
r ¢ ÃA = f
¤ + cA ¢ ®E ¢ (ÃE ¡ ÃA) (18)
r ¢ ÃT = ±
¤ ¢ w + cT ¢ ®E ¢ (ÃE ¡ ÃT) (19)
with
f
¤ = b + ®E ¢ (1 ¡ cA)
w + ¹E ¢ s ¡ b
r + ¹E + ®E
(20)
7Moreover, this assumption has been made in previous studies. For example, Dolado
et al. (2000) assume in a matching model with skilled and unskilled workers and jobs, that
wages in the unskilled sector are such that they equal the reservation wage of workers.
15and
±
¤ =
1
w
(w + ¹E ¢ s ¡ (r + ¹E + cT ¢ ®E)
w + ¹E ¢ s ¡ b
r + ¹E + ®E
): (21)
If unassigned agency workers are as eﬀective searchers as unemployed work-
ers, agencies pay a retainer fee f¤ that equals income from unemployment. If
those workers were more eﬀective in searching for a regular job than unem-
ployed workers, agencies would oﬀer a retainer fee lower than income from
unemployment to make their employees as equally well oﬀ as unemployed
workers, and vice versa. Note also, that if cT = 1, assigned agency workers
are as eﬀective searchers as unemployed workers, and so equation (21) tells
that ±¤ = b=w. This implies that assigned workers earn ±¤ ¢ w = b. Making
use of the wage equation (which is developed in the next section, see equa-
tion (24)), it is possible to show that the income of assigned workers is less
than income from unemployment (±¤ ¢ w < b) if cT > 1 and ±¤ ¢ w > b if
0 < cT < 1. Thus, if an assigned worker proﬁts from having a higher search
eﬀectiveness than an unemployed worker, the temporary work agency will
reap the beneﬁts from that by increasing the mark-down on wages paid in
regular jobs. If the temporary agency worker’s search eﬀectiveness suﬀers
from being assigned (cT < 1), then the temporary work agency has to de-
crease the mark-down, so that income from an assignment becomes higher
than income from unemployment. Otherwise, the worker would not take up
a job at a temporary work agency.
Under the equilibrium assumption all ﬁrms pay a wage w. Then, the
present discounted value of an employed worker becomes ÃE instead of ÃE;i.
Solving the value functions of the workers for the diﬀerence in the present
discounted values between being employed and unemployed yields
ÃE ¡ ÃU =
w + ¹E ¢ s ¡ b
r + ®E + ¹E
: (22)
Note that for a suﬃciently low parameter value b, incentive compatibility is
always fulﬁlled.
3.4 Wages
Wages on regular jobs are determined by Nash bargaining. Usually it is
assumed that ﬁrms are small relative to the economy so that the bargained
wage wi between a worker and a ﬁrm has no impact on the equilibrium wage
w. The threat point for the workers is the value of being unemployed ÃU
16and for the ﬁrm it is the value of a vacant job JE;V . The wage from Nash
bargaining is the solution of the weighted product that maximizes the net
return for a worker and a ﬁrm of a ﬁlled job
Ωi
max wi
= (ÃE;i ¡ ÃU)
¯ ¢ (JE;F;i ¡ JE;V)
1¡¯:
With the free entry condition the value of a vacancy becomes zero (JE;V = 0).
Furthermore, the value of being unemployed is independent from wi. Hence,
the ﬁrst order condition is
¯ ¢ JE;F;i ¢
@ÃE;i
@wi
= (¯ ¡ 1)(ÃE;i ¡ ÃU)
@JE;F;i
@wi
: (23)
Under the equilibrium assumption we get the wage setting curve by in-
serting ÃE ¡ ÃU from (22) and JE from (6) into equation (23) as
w =
¯
1 ¡ ¯
¢
kE
qE
¢ (r + ¹E + ®E) ¡ ¹E ¢ s + b: (24)
The wage setting equation closes the model. It gives the bargained wage
as a function of labor market tightness µE. As the job arrival rate ®E(µE) is
increasing in market tightness, and the vacancy ﬁlling rate for regular jobs
(qE = qE(µE)) is decreasing in market tightness, and ¯=(1¡¯) > 0 the wage
setting curve is upward sloping.
The model solves recursively. The wage setting curve (24) and the labor
demand curve (5) for regular jobs in sector E give the bargained wage w
and labor market tightness µE. Then, one can solve for ¾¤ using equation
(15). The marginal condition for the demand for temporary jobs (10) gives
labor market tightness µT. Equations (20) and (21) determine the retainer
fee f¤ and the fraction ±¤ of the wage on regular jobs that temporary workers
receive, respectively. In the next step, one can use equation (14) to solve for
labor market tightness in A. Finally, inserting µE, µA, and µU in the ﬂow
conditions, equations (1) to (4), gives the equilibrium rate of unemployment
u, regular employment e, assignments t, and idle labor a at temporary work
agencies.
174 Analytical results
4.1 The emergence of temporary work agencies
We already established that the wage setting schedule is upward sloping and
labor demand for regular jobs is downward sloping in the real wage tightness
space. Pissarides (1990) shows that there exists an equilibrium in a model
with one type of job (E). We will explore under which conditions temporary
work agencies will come into existence. Formally, whether there exists a
positive labor market tightness µA. In the appendix a proof is presented
stating, that one will observe temporary work agencies as intermediaries on
the labor market if they are suﬃciently good at assigning workers to client
ﬁrms. Thus in our model the emergence and growth of temporary agency
work is due to an upward shift in the matching eﬃciency parameter mT. The
question is why this may have occurred?
In many European countries one of the key factors is almost certainly the
de-regulation of the sector, which was sketched in section 2. As de-regulation
increases the opportunity for agencies to perform matching activities, it is
certainly one of the obvious candidates to enable the emergence and growth
of agency work in the 1990s in the OECD.
It was argued in section 2 that the characteristic feature of agency work
was the outsourcing of the matching function to the intermediary. Matching
on the labor market is one of the classic examples of exchange under asym-
metric information, see Spence (1973), and is often phrased in terms of job
searchers having more information of their capabilities and eﬀort levels than
the ﬁrm. In this situation an intermediary can reduce the uncertainty facing
the ﬁrm as the agency will have the incentive to accurately report the quality
of their workers to the client ﬁrm in order to build and maintain their repu-
tation. The agency will be more concerned with reputation than a single job
searcher as the agency has a greater number of possible future transactions.
Furthermore, as the agency specializes in recruitment, i.e. search, screening
and possibly training, this specialization will probably imply that an agency
will recruit more workers than a typical client ﬁrm and thus may exploit
economies of scale.8 In the case of a temporary work agency, the uncertainty
to the client ﬁrm is further diminished by the fact that, unlike hiring through
a recruitment agency, the client ﬁrm does not need to adopt any employment
8Autor (2001a) ﬁnds that temporary work agencies provide training to screen workers.
18risk and indeed a guarantee of quality may even be stipulated explicitly in the
commercial contract between the agency and the client ﬁrm for the duration
of the assignment.
The improvement of reputation has been a very prominent strategy of
many agency companies in the last decade and several companies, such as
Manpower and Randstad, have become recognizable brand names. This is
almost certainly related to the two factors mentioned above, i.e. the infor-
mation role played by agencies and the recent legal history of agency work.
Prior to de-regulation, when agencies operated often in a legal grey zone,
reputation was generally low and many were associated with shady prac-
tices. They have sought to build reputation with both potential employees
and client ﬁrms by means of ethical codes of practice, advertising campaigns
and the signing of collective agreements, see Storrie (2002). Furthermore,
the agency sector has undergone considerable market consolidation during
the 1990s. According to CIETT (2000), by 1998 the top ﬁve temporary work
agencies accounted for over ﬁfty per cent of turnover in eleven of the mem-
bers states of the European Union. This process may have served to push
out some of the smaller and less reputable agencies. Improved reputation has
presumably improved the matching eﬃciency of temporary work agencies in
that they are able to attract better job applicants and to gain acceptance
of agency work with the personnel departments and the trade unions at the
client ﬁrm.
Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) note that technological advances can
shift the matching parameter upwards. The rapid growth of agency work
since the beginning of the 1990s coincided with the widespread introduction
of information and communication technology (ICT). Internet job sites are
able to contain appreciably more vacancy and job searcher information at
much lower cost than, for example, newspapers. However, the availability of
this technology by no means necessarily implies that there will be an increase
in the direct contact between ﬁrms and job searchers without going through
a matching intermediary. The fact that the technology signiﬁcantly lowers
the cost for the job seeker to apply for jobs may lead to employers being
inundated with applications. Moreover, Autor (2001b) argues that there
may be adverse selection and that intermediaries such as, temporary work
agencies will be required to reap the beneﬁts of the computerized matching
technologies.9 Thus the idea here is that ICT has the potential to increase
9Furthermore, the role of intermediaries for providing high quality information is a
19matching eﬃciency. However, this potential can only be fully realized if
exploited by intermediaries such as temporary work agencies.
Coordination failures, i.e the uncoordinated action of ﬁrms and workers,
are according to Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001), potentially a major source
of matching ineﬃciency. Just as the Business and Industrial Organisation
literature has observed how supply and client ﬁrms coordinate their activities,
there is evidence of increased coordination between agency and client ﬁrms.
Indeed, Belkacem (1998), in a comparative study of France and Germany,
compared the agency client ﬁrm relationship with other sub-contractors of
the client ﬁrm. Macaire and Michon (2001) ﬁnd that agency work is becoming
more integrated into management systems of the client undertakings and is
thus much more than a one-oﬀ measure to cope with unexpected situations.
Thus, as temporary work agencies build up business relationships with their
client ﬁrms and better understand their labor requirements, they may be
more able to avoid coordination failure. This is a process that takes time
and may be related to learning-by-doing. The learning process of agencies
may also be related to sectors or regions as empirically illustrated for France
in Lefevre et al. (2001).
Thus, the explanation for increased matching eﬃciency in temporary work
agencies is that with de-regulation agencies were able to devote themselves to
these activities, in some countries, for the ﬁrst time and in others more easily.
After de-regulation the agencies were able to build upon their reputation in
order to attract workers and client ﬁrms. Reputation is also a vital factor
in convincing the client ﬁrm that the agency will provide it with correct
information on worker capabilities. As the agency becomes more like a supply
ﬁrm, the closer relations between the agency and the client ﬁrm serve to
reduce coordination failure. The learning-by-doing process also may apply
to sectors and locations. There are thus a number of reasons why matching
eﬃciency in agencies may have increased in the 1990s and of course we cannot
distinguish between these various possibilities.
4.2 Comparative static results
Besides the emergence condition for temporary work agencies as intermedi-
aries on the labor market, we can establish some comparative static results
much-researched issue in the E-commerce literature, see Malone et al. (1987) and Sarkar
et al. (1995), which stresses economies of scale and scope and the reputation issue men-
tioned above.
20Table 2: Comparative static results
w µE µT µA e a t u
mA 0 0 0 +
mT 0 0 +
mE
cT 0 0 0
kA 0 0 0 ¡
kT 0 0 ¡
kE ¡
¹T 0 0 + ¡
¹E ¡
¯ + ¡ ¡
b + ¡ ¡
s ¡ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
from our model (see table 2). Increasing the labor share in wage bargaining
(¯) turns the wage setting curve anti-clockwise (cf. (24)). As labor demand
in the regular sector does not shift (see equation (7)), this yields a higher
wage for regular jobs and a less tight market for ﬁrms in E. As µE decreases
so does labor market tightness for ﬁrms in T. This follows from the fact
that agencies will charge a ¾ that makes present expected proﬁts for jobs in
E and T equal. Under the zero proﬁt condition this implies equal average
hiring costs which drives the decrease of µT as µE falls.
Higher income from unemployment (b) shifts the wage setting curve up-
ward. A change in b does not impact on labor demand. Therefore, wages
in regular jobs increase and labor market tightness for ﬁrms in sector E de-
clines. Furthermore, one observes a decrease in labor market tightness for
ﬁrms opening a vacancy in T.
Larger severance payments (s) move the wage setting curve downwards.
Labor demand also shifts downwards. Hence, wages are lower. Eliminating
the wage from equations (24) and (7) shows that labor market tightness in
E is not aﬀected by changes in severance payments. This result is discussed
in Burda (1992). As net returns are not aﬀected by changes in severance
payments, there is also no change in labor market tightness for ﬁrms in T.
This follows from the reasoning sketched above, namely that average hiring
21costs have to be equal between E and T. That tightness µA is unaﬀected can
be seen from inserting f¤, ¾¤, ±¤ and w into the right hand side of equation
(14) which leaves it unchanged if severance payments should alter. Finally,
from the ﬂow conditions, one can observe that the employment structure, e,
a, t, and unemployment u are not aﬀected by changes in severance payments.
Raising the costs for opening a vacancy in E turns the wage setting curve
anti-clockwise. In addition labor demand becomes steeper. Therefore, the
net impact on the wage level is ambiguous. Labor market tightness for ﬁrms
in E decreases, inducing an increase in the vacancy ﬁlling rate. Thus, the
impact on average hiring costs is also ambiguous.
Increasing the hiring cost (kT) for ﬁrms hiring from agencies has no impact
on wages and labor market tightness µE. Under the equal expected returns
constraint, it follows from equation (10) that the vacancy ﬁlling rate qT has
to rise. This brings a drop in labor market tightness µT. The impact on µA
is ambiguous.
If costs of hiring into the pool of temporary work agencies rise, this will
only bring about a drop in labor market tightness µA. This follows from
equation (14).
A higher job destruction rate for jobs in sector E shifts the wage setting
curve down and turns it anti-clockwise. Labor demand also shifts down and
becomes steeper. Hence, wages will be lower. The impact on labor market
tightness for ﬁrms in sector E is ambiguous.
If jobs in T go sour at higher rate wages, w and µE are not aﬀected.
Inserting ¾¤ into the right hand side of equation (10) shows that average
hiring costs for T are independent from the job destruction rate ¹T. Hence,
labor market tightness µT will be unaﬀected. The right hand side of equation
(14) becomes smaller which brings about a rise in the vacancy ﬁlling rate for
A. Consequently labor market tightness µA has to fall.
If search eﬀectiveness of assigned workers increases, one will not observe
any impact on wages, and labor market tightness µE and µT.
There are no unambiguous results that could be reported for changes
in the matching scale parameter for sector E. However, an increase of mT
raises labor market tightness in T, while it leaves wages and µE unaﬀected. A
change in the scale parameter for matches of unemployed workers and vacan-
cies posted by temporary work agencies, mA, raises labor market tightness
µA but does not change, w, µE, and µT.
225 Numerical examples
As a number of results are ambiguous, especially as regards the impact on
the employment and unemployment rates, we conduct a numerical exercise.
The values chosen are similar to those in previous numerical exercises with
matching models (see table 3 for a summary of the baseline parameters).
With those parameters the baseline model yields an employment rate of
90.7%, an unemployment rate of 6.6%, and a share of temporary agency
work in the labor force of 2.7%.
Table 3: Baseline parameter values, quarterly calibration
Job productivity y = 1
Real interest rate r=0.0125
Productivity shock frequency for ﬁrms in E ¹E = 0:05
Productivity shock frequency for ﬁrms in A ¹A = 0:3
Productivity shock frequency for ﬁrms in T ¹T = 0:05
Per time unit hiring cost in E kE = 1:2
Per time unit hiring cost in A kA = 5
Per time unit hiring cost in T kT = 1
Workers’ rent share ¯ = 0:6
Income from unemployment b = 0:5
Matching elasticity º = 0:5
Matching scale factor for E mE = 1
Matching scale factor for A mA = 2:5
Matching scale factor for T mT = 2:5
Relative search eﬀectiveness from A cA = 1
Relative search eﬀectiveness from T cT = 1:1
Severance pay s = 7
Table 4 presents results of calculations that deal with the crowding-out
aspect of temporary agency work. It could be argued that deregulation of
the temporary agency work may increase agency employment at the cost
of a reduction of regular employment. However, this is not necessarily the
case. In our example the crowding-out of regular jobs crucially depends
on the search eﬀectiveness of workers while on an assignment. There are
reasons to suppose that such search may be particularly eﬀective. While
23on assignment the agency employee may have better access to information
on job openings at the work place than the unemployed. Also with the
agency worker on location, the employer may more eﬀectively search among
the assigned employees. Moreover, the fact that the assigned worker has
been screened and assigned by the agency may be a valuable signal to the
employer. While one could argue that the assigned worker has less time for
search, it would appear likely that the search eﬃciency enhancing factors
should dominate.
We simulate two deregulation scenarios. In one the matching eﬃciency for
assigning workers at client ﬁrms is increased. In the other, the costs of open-
ing a vacancy for temporary work are reduced. We state percentage changes
in employment and unemployment with respect to the baseline calibration
for diﬀerent values of search eﬀectiveness. If the matching parameter mT is
increased to cT = 0:9, we observe a drop in both unemployment (11.23%)
and regular employment (0.59%) while temporary agency work increases.
This follows from the ﬁxed labor force assumption. In this case, policy that
increases matching eﬃciency of agencies does indeed crowd out regular jobs.
This result also holds for a search eﬀectiveness of cT which assumes that
assigned workers are as eﬀective searchers as unemployed workers. However,
there is no crowding-out of regular jobs accompanying a policy that raises
matching eﬃciency if relative search eﬀectiveness is cT = 1:2 or cT = 1:3.
Then, both regular employment and temporary agency work increase. A sim-
ilar picture emerges if we reduce the costs of opening a vacancy. As long as
relative search eﬀectiveness of assigned workers is less than unity, regular jobs
will be crowded out. If, as was argued above, that assigned workers are more
eﬀective searchers than unemployed workers, a policy that reduces tempo-
rary agencies’ costs of opening vacancy increases both regular employment
and employment at temporary work agencies. Thus, a labor market with
temporary work agencies that reduce frictions in matching can contribute to
more regular employment.
These ﬁndings may be interpreted as a policy complementarity which are
increasingly been seen as critical in the evaluation of policy measures, Coe
and Snower (1997). Our calculations, for example, suggests that deregulation
of the temporary work agency sector will only not crowd out regular jobs
if cutting costs for opening a vacancy or measures that improve matching
eﬃciency at a temporary work agency are accompanied with a policy that
ensures suﬃciently high search eﬀectiveness of assigned workers. There are
practices of temporary work agencies that may eﬀect the search eﬀectiveness
24Table 4: Numerical example: crowding-out
mT = 3 kA = 4:5
cT ∆e ∆u ∆e ∆u
0.9 -0.59 -11.23 -0.55 -6.04
1 -0.23 -9.80 -0.23 -4.54
1.2 0.29 -7.58 0.22 -2.22
1.3 0.48 -6.70 0.38 -1.30
Change is in % with respect to the outcomes of the baseline model
of assigned workers. For example, in the UK the agency may require a
“transfer-fee” if the assigned worker becomes employed at the client ﬁrm. In
other countries, for example, Sweden such practices are explicitly prohibited
in law.
6 Concluding remarks
Temporary agency work has grown very rapidly throughout the OECD in
the 1990s, is a somewhat novel contractual form and has been extensively
deregulated in many countries. Somewhat surprisingly, there has been prac-
tically no theoretical research on agency work and rather limited empirical
work.
In this paper we attempt to theoretically approach the increasing use
of temporary agency work by using a matching model. The equilibrium
unemployment model captures the frictions in the labor market that tem-
porary work agencies may serve to ease. The model seeks to explain why
we have observed the emergence and increase of temporary agency work in
most OECD countries. Another concern was whether the deregulation of
temporary agency work necessarily crowds out regular jobs.
We show that temporary work agencies will come into existence as a la-
bor market intermediary if a certain level of matching eﬃciency is attained
in assigning workers to client ﬁrms. In the past decade many factors, such as
deregulation, particularly in Europe, and technological improvements that
allow posting of vacancies through the internet which can only be fully ex-
ploited by matching intermediaries, may have contributed to this suﬃciently
25high level of matching eﬃciency. Throughout the decade the increase in
matching eﬃciency was sustained by improvements in the reputation of agen-
cies and, with ever-closer relationships with the client ﬁrms, some mitigation
of coordination failure. Thus, temporary agency work continued to grow
during the 1990s.
We derived some comparative static results. However, some of the in-
teresting issues could only be addressed by numerical examples. These nu-
merical examples show that the growth of temporary agency work does not
necessarily crowd out regular employment. Both regular employment and
agency work, increase as long as the search eﬀectiveness of assigned work-
ers is suﬃciently high relative to unemployed workers. We argue that there
are several reasons to suppose that search while assigned to a ﬁrm is rel-
atively eﬀective, due to signaling eﬀects and the low information costs of
both employer and worker search. In this context it may thus be important
that de-regulation of the sector as regards assignments should also address
practices within agencies which place barriers on assigned workers moving
on to regular jobs at the same employer. This result may be seen in the light
of policy complementarities, in that single pieces of legislation may not be
successful and that one rather has to launch a package of policies to assure
positive results.
Appendix
Proposition 1 There is always a positive labor market tightness µT. For
suﬃciently high matching eﬃciency mT, labor market tightness µA will be
positive.
Proof 1 Under the assumption of equal net returns for ﬁrms in E and T,
the left hand side of equation (10) is always positive which implies a positive
µT.
¿From equation (14) follows that there is a positive µA if the net returns
from having an unproductive job (a ﬁlled vacancy with an idle worker to be
assigned) are positive for a temporary work agency. The denominator of (14)
is always positive. Hence, one will observe a positive µA if
®T > f ¢
r + ¹T + cT ¢ ®E
(¾¤ ¡ ±¤) ¢ w
: (25)
26The right hand side of this inequality is a function of labor market tightness
in E only. Also observe, that the parameter mT does not show up on the right
hand side, but only in ®T. Under the assumption of equal present discounted
expected proﬁts we can take labor demand equations (7) and (10) and solve
for the vacancy ﬁlling rate in T
qT =
kT
kE
¢ qE: (26)
The wage setting schedule and labor demand for E determine µE and there-
fore the right hand side of equation (26). Say that a set of parameters
f¯;kE;¹E;mE;s;b;kT;r;yg yields a vacancy ﬁlling rate ¯ qT following equa-
tion (26). The properties of the vacancy ﬁlling rate qT are such that a com-
bination of f¯ mT; ¯ µTg will yield ¯ qT as well as a combination f˜ mT; ˜ µTg with
˜ mT > ¯ mT and ˜ µT > ¯ µT. As the job arrival rate ®T is increasing in mT and
µT, one can always ﬁnd a suﬃciently high matching scale parameter mT so
that condition (25) is satisﬁed.
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